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PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS IN THE COURT BELOW 
The caption of this case contains all of the parties to the proceedings in the 
court below. 
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JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court does not have jurisdiction over this matter because 
the parties have fully settled their claims and dismissed the case. This case is therefore 
nnnil II ihrf iiiiiifi liinl' lliu iiiullc! is mil mi nit, |iinsdn lion r- junpci pui^uanl to section 
78-2-2(3)0) of the Utah Code and Rule 3(a) of the Utah Rules < >f - ^ ppell; it< : P n :n jed/i ire. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
iciher u;\$ v ourt has jurisdiction to hear the merits of a case that has 
beei 1 d" -•- - • toenb : Inden :i i ill:;; ' Ii ISI irance Coi i lpai p ' i n ider R uJe 
41(a)(2)(i) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
2. Whether Phoenix can recover damages in excess of the jury verdict. 
.cmci iiL ;. ..i! court correctly ruled that Phoenix does not have an 
implied indemi lity claim against Yardley. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1, Where a party has improperly brought an appeal where the trial court never 
entevu .JL.:., . -.. ,:., .ippcal may be summarily dismissed. See Utah R. 
App. P. 10(a)(1). 
2 Whether Phoenix can recover damages in excess of the jury verdict is a 
question of:sw ihat is reviewed for correctness. See Booth v. Attorneys' Title Guar. 
Fund. ..• ! - J2;;i (Uta l i J 0 0 1 I 
1 
3. Whether the trial court correctly ruled that Phoenix does not have an 
implied indemnity claim against Yardiey is a question of law that is reviewed for 
correctness. See id. 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, 
STATUTES AND RULES 
1. Section 78-2-2(3)0) of the Utah Code. 
2. Section 78-27-38 of the Utah Code. 
3. Rule 41(a)(2)(i) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
4. Rule 3(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This action arose out of an accident that occurred on October 20, 1997 
between Jason D. Merrill (uMerrill") and Marlene Yardiey (uYardiey")- (R- 1)- Several 
months following the accident, Merrill's insurance company Phoenix Indemnity 
Insurance Company ("Phoenix") filed a subrogation action against Yardiey. (R. 1-3). An 
answer to Phoenix's complaint was filed by Yardiey on or about September 2, 1998. 
Meanwhile a suit arose between Yardiey and her insurer, Guaranty National, 
in case number 980902057 in the Third District Court. (R. 62, 219). The suit was a 
declaratory judgment action brought by Guaranty National to determine whether Yardiey 
had paid the required premiums, which would determine whether Yardiey was insured at 
the time of the accident between Yardiey and Merrill. (R. 62, 219). 
2 
On or about November 30, 1999, Phoenix1 moved for partial summary 
judgment arguing that the undisputed facts entitled Phoenix to relief based on various 
indemnification theories.2 (R. 144, 148). In that motion, Phoenix requested judgment 
based on indemnity in the amount of $25,000, $3,541.67 in accrued pre-judgment interest 
at a rate of 10%, $10,485.64 in attorney's fees, and $2,915.24 in costs, totaling 
$41,942.55. (R.209). 
Yardley filed an opposition memorandum which the trial court treated as a 
cross-motion for partial summary judgment. (R. 148). On March 21, 1999, the trial court 
denied Phoenix's motion for partial summary judgment and granted Yardley's cross-
motion for partial summary judgment, stating that uan implied indemnity claim or any 
other claim under quasi contract principles as against the defendants are not proper causes 
of action in this context." (R. 474, see Order Re Partial Summary Judgment and Motion 
for Continuance attached hereto as Addendum 1). 
As this ruling only disposed of a portion of Phoenix's claims against Yardley, 
the case continued on to trial which was held March 20-22, 2000. (R. 531). At trial, the 
jury returned a verdict finding that Yardley was 60% negligent in the accident and that 
1
 In February 1999, the district court granted Phoenix leave to amend the 
complaint to add Merrill as a plaintiff. Reference is made to plaintiffs collectively as 
"Phoenix." 
2
 Even though no causes of action based on indemnification were set forth in 
the complaint. 
3 
Merrill was 40% negligent. (R. 544). Disagreements then arose between the parties 
regarding the form of proposed orders of judgment, and so a judgment on the jury verdict 
was never signed and entered by the court. (Docketing Statement ^ 8(r)). The parties 
agreed that rather than submitting a proposed order of judgment to the trial court, Yardley 
would pay $13,243.78 and then Phoenix and Yardley filed a Stipulated Motion to 
Dismiss, pursuant to Rule 41(a)(2), whereby both parties agreed to dismiss Phoenix's 
action against Yardley. (R. 575). 
The motion, drafted by Phoenix's counsel, stated that '*[t]he underlying claim 
has been satisfactorily settled, and no counterclaims, objections, or motions remain 
pending." (R. 575; see Stipulated Motion to Dismiss attached hereto as Addendum 2). 
Pursuant to the Stipulated Motion to Dismiss, Yardley paid to settle Phoenix's claims 
against Yardley. (Docketing Statement f^ 8(r)). On August 3, 2000. the trial court signed 
an Order of Dismissal, drafted by Phoenix's counsel, that dismissed Phoenix's action 
against Yardley pursuant to Rule 41(a)(2). (R. 578; see Stipulated Motion to Dismiss 
attached hereto as Addendum 3). 
Despite the settlement and dismissal of Phoenix's claims against Yardley, 
Phoenix filed a Notice of Appeal on September 1, 2000. (R. 584). In May 2001, Yardley 
filed a Motion for Summary Disposition with this Court arguing that this Court lacked 
jurisdiction to hear Phoenix's appeal because of the stipulated settlement and dismissal of 
4 
the action. (See Defendants' Motion for Summary Disposition attached hereto as 
Addendum 4). That motion is still pending before this Court. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Initially, this Court lacks jurisdiction to hear this appeal because case number 
980600228, Phoenix Indemnity Company vs. Yardley, has been settled, paid, and 
dismissed in its entirety; therefore, there is no appealable judgment. (R. 578). For the 
same reasons, the appeal is moot. 
In addition, Phoenix should not be allowed to sidestep the Utah Comparative 
Fault statute by asking for judgment in excess of Yardley's liability determined by the 
jury at trial, and as agreed upon by the parties during settlement. 
Finally, Phoenix is not entitled to indemnity. Indemnity may lie in three 
situations: 1) express agreement, 2) implied agreement, or 3) in the absence of an express 
or implied agreement, under equitable indemnity. There is no express agreement claim. 
Nor is there evidence that the parties' conduct lead to an implied in fact contract of 
indemnity. Further, Phoenix has not met the requirements for equitable indemnity. 
Phoenix demands reimbursement, yet it has already received it through the 
settlement amount achieved through its subrogation action. (Docketing Statement ^ 8(r)). 
Accordingly, Phoenix's position is nothing more than an attempt to stretch the doctrine of 
indemnity in a way that would allow it to escape the settlement and dismissal of this case. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THIS COURT LACKS JURISDICTION TO HEAR 
PHOENIX'S APPEAL.3 
This Court has held that it will not exercise jurisdiction over matters that have 
become moot. See Millard County v. Utah State Tax Com'n. ex rel. Intermountain Power 
Agency, 823 P.2d 459, 461 (Utah 1991). Phoenix's appeal is moot. When the parties to a 
lawsuit have settled4 their claims and the trial court has granted a stipulated motion to 
dismiss before an order of judgment has been issued, the matter is rendered moot and the 
appellate courts are deprived of jurisdiction over the case. See id. (holding that settlement 
by all parties rendered the appeal moot making party's appeal defective for lack of 
jurisdiction); Black v. Alpha Financial Corp., 656 P.2d 409 (Utah 1982) (holding that 
party's acceptance of settlement rendered controversy moot for purposes of appeal 
thereby denying appellate courts jurisdiction). 
Here, Phoenix agreed that 
[p]ursuant to Rule 41(a)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
3
 Yardley's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Disposition is 
attached hereto as Addendum 4, and Yardley incorporates the material therein by 
reference. 
4
 After the jury verdict, the parties agreed to a settlement and Guaranty 
National Insurance on behalf of Yardley paid to Phoenix the sum of $13,242.78, which 
included Yardley's proportionate share of the verdict, recoverable court costs, 
prejudgment interest on special damages, and reimbursement of no fault medical 
payments. (See letters and check attached hereto as Addendum 5). 
6 
Plaintiffs and Defendants hereby jointly move and stipulate that the 
within action be dismissed [and that the] underlying claim has been 
satisfactorily settled, and no counterclaims, objections, or motions 
remain pending. 
(R. 575). The district court granted the request and stated in an order dratted by 
Phoenix's counsel: "IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the above-entitled action be, and 
hereby is, DISMISSED."5 (R. 578). Having voluntarily accepted a settlement payment, 
its appeal in the matter is moot and should be summarily dismissed for lack of 
jurisdiction. 
Additionally, this Court lacks jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 3(a) of the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure, which states that this Court may hear appeals "from all 
final orders and judgments." Phoenix seeks to appeal the partial summary judgment that 
determined that Phoenix may not recover under a theory of implied indemnity. However, 
Utah case law is clear that a partial summary judgment is not a final judgment within the 
meaning of either section 78-2-2(3)(j) of the Utah Code, or Rule 3(a) of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure because a partial summary judgment does not end the controversy 
between the parties. See Bradbury v. Valencia, 5 P.3d 649, 651 (Utah 2000); Regan v. 
Blount 978 P.2d 1051 (Utah Ct. App. 1999). Therefore. Phoenix's Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment is not within this Court's appellate jurisdiction. 
5The plain language makes it clear that the whole case was dismissed, not just 
parts. 
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Further, it should be noted that Phoenix has often asserted that this is an appeal 
of a contractual issue, not negligence: ^Yardley's constant attempt to inject negligence 
principles into this contractual dispute [etc.] . . . ." (Appellants' Br. at 31). Phoenix also 
appears to assert a claim based on equitable indemnity and restitution. (Appellants' Br. at 
18, 33). Because there is no trace of a contract or any other cause of action besides the 
negligence claim set forth in the complaint, Phoenix cannot raise these claims in a motion 
for summary judgment or on appeal. (R. 1-3). 
For the foregoing reasons, this appeal should be summarily dismissed for lack 
ofjurisdiction. 
II. PHOENIX'S INDEMNITY CLAIM IS AN ATTEMPT AT 
DOUBLE RECOVERY THAT SIDESTEPS THE UTAH 
COMPARATIVE FAULT STATUTE. 
Phoenix's attempt to claim implied indemnity is an attempt at double recovery. 
The $40,000 requested by Phoenix on appeal is in addition to the money already received 
in the settlement. (Docketing Statement f 8(r), Appellants' Br. at 42). 
Further, Phoenix attempts an end run around Utah statute. Section 78-27-38 of 
the Utah Code states that ''[n]0 defendant is liable to any person seeking recovery for any 
amount in excess of the proportion of fault attributed to that defendant under Section 78-
27-39 [entitled Separate special verdicts on total damages and proportion of fault]." This 
matter was tried to a jury that determined that the total damages arising out of the 
8 
accident totaled $15,663.61. (R. 545). The jury further concluded on the special verdict 
form that Yardley was 60% at fault making her responsible for $8,707.14 of the damages. 
(R. 544). Based upon the jury verdict and the above statutory scheme, Yardley "is not 
liable to any person" beyond $8,707.14. However, after the jury verdict the parties agreed 
to a settlement and Guaranty National Insurance on behalf of Yardley paid to Phoenix the 
sum of $13,242.78, which included Yardley's proportionate share of the verdict, 
recoverable court costs, prejudgment interest on special damages, and reimbursement of 
no fault medical payments. (See letters and check attached hereto as Addendum 5). 
However, Phoenix's implied indemnity claim seeks to sidestep the jury finding 
and mandated result after applying the verdict to the statutory scheme. To illustrate, 
Yardley has already paid Phoenix under the settlement agreement. (Docketing Statement 
*j 8(r)). In addition, Yardley seeks an indemnification judgment of $40,868.00 and claims 
that w*[j]udgment should enter against Yardley for damages owing under the implied 
indemnity contract in the sum of $40,868.00." (Appellants' Br. at 42). If you add up 
everything Phoenix wants, it amounts to many times what the jury verdict result was and 
beyond what was paid in return for the agreed upon dismissal. If implied indemnity were 
to be imposed, it would completely gut the factual determinations of damages and liability 
9 
made by the jury and the comparative fault protections afforded to Yardley by the statute.6 
In addition, at trial the jury heard Phoenix's evidence that it had paid Merrill $25,000. 
Thus, by finding damages in an amount greatly less than $25,000, the jury simply did not 
agree that this was a $25,000 case. 
Not only is it unfair for Yardley to pay more than what she is obligated under 
the statute, but if she were to pay more than her share it would be a windfall to both 
Merrill and Phoenix. The jury determined that Merrill was 40% at fault in causing the 
$15,000 in damages that they determined arose from the accident. (R. 544-45). 
Phoenix's indemnification theory would have Yardley pay Merrill's share (and more) of 
the damages. Phoenix's indemnity theory also asks Yardley to bear the cost of Phoenix's 
overpayment to Merrill, in addition to Phoenix's attorneys fees and other costs. (R. 209, 
Appellants' Br. at 42). 
Yet by the same token, it would be unfair for Phoenix to pay Yardley's tort 
liability. Thus, the law (usually by statute) recognizes a form of reimbursement called 
subrogation7 in which the insurer collects only the amount of the motorist's tort liability, 
6
 If the legislature wanted to provide some exception to the comparative fault 
statute for indemnity, it would have been an easy matter to say so in the statute. 
7
 Black's Law Dictionary, 6th ed., defines subrogation in part as follows: 
[t]he right of one who has paid an obligation which another should 
have paid to be indemnified by the other. A device adopted by 
equity to compel ultimate discharge of an obligation by him who in 
10 
but no more (e.g. additional contract losses). Thus, subrogation exempts the insurer from 
paying for the fault of others, while at the same time honoring the comparative fault 
statutory scheme. 
In summary, Phoenix should not be allowed double recovery in this case. Nor 
should Yardley be held liable for an amount greater than the jury verdict determined 
amount, and especially should not have to pay for Merrill's 40% portion of the damages, 
nor Merrill's attorneys fees and costs, nor Phoenix's excessive settlement payments to 
Merrill. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT 
PHOENIX DOES NOT HAVE AN INDEMNITY CLAIM 
AGAINST YARDLEY. 
Utah courts recognize a right to indemnity in three situations: 1) by express 
agreement; 2) by implied agreement; or 3) in the absence of an agreement under implied 
in law or equitable indemnity ("equitable indemnity"). See Freund v. Utah Power & 
Light Co., 793 P.2d 362 (Utah 1980) (acknowledging the validity of express indemnity 
agreements, and noting the possibility of implied indemnity agreements under the right 
circumstances); Perrv v. Pioneer Wholesale Supply Co.. 681 P.2d 214. 218 (Utah 1984) 
(dealing with equitable indemnity). 
good conscience ought to pay it. 
This definition suggests that subrogation is a means for achieving indemnity, the same 
goal strived for by the doctrine of equitable indemnity. 
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Phoenix does not claim an express agreement, thus eliminating the first option. 
Phoenix does however claim the latter two types of indemnity apply to its case; namely, 
indemnity implied in fact and equitable indemnity.8 Phoenix's indemnity arguments are 
without merit and are discussed in turn below. 
A. There is no implied in fact indemnity contract. 
Phoenix argues that Yardley and Phoenix entered into a ''contract implied in 
fact" of indemnity. (See Appellants' Br. at 34). However, this argument is without merit. 
This Court has stated that an implied in fact contract is one in which 1) there is a meeting 
of the minds, and 2) both parties demonstrate an intent to be bound by an agreement that 
has not been expressly stated. See Morgan v. Board of State Lands, 549 P.2d 695, 696 
n.l (Utah 1976) ("Both express and implied contracts grow out of the intention of the 
contracting parties and in each case there must be a meeting of the minds before there can 
be a contract.") (quoting Richards v. Kuppinger, 278 P.2d 395 (Wash. 1955)). Also, in 
8
 Phoenix often blends these two concepts, and sometimes lumps both under 
the name "implied indemnity." However, he specifically asks this Court to find a 
"Contract Implied In Fact," and that when "Yardley chose to drive an uninsured vehicle 
and negligently injure [sic] Jason Merrill, she entered into a contract with Phoenix as a 
matter of law." (Appellants' Br. at 29). Given that the Utah Court of Appeals has 
sometimes referred to equitable indemnity as a contract implied in law, and that the term 
is used in the midst of his discussion of the elements of equitable indemnity, Yardley 
assumes that Phoenix's use of the terms "contract... as a matter of law" refers to 
common law or equitable indemnity. See Hanover Limited v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 758 
P.2d 443, 445 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (an example in which the Court of Appeals uses the 
term contract implied in law). 
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Davies v. Olson. 746 P.2d 264, 268 (Utah Ct. App. 1987), the Utah Court of Appeals 
stated: "The elements of a contract implied in fact are: (1) the defendant requested the 
plaintiff to perform work; (2) the plaintiff expected the defendant to compensate him or 
her for those services; and (3) the defendant knew or should have known that the plaintiff 
expected compensation."9 Thus, to establish the existence of an implied in fact contract 
in this case would require Phoenix to show that Yardley's conduct manifested an intent or 
somehow requested that Phoenix provide coverage to Merrill in the event of an accident, 
and that Yardley and Phoenix had a meeting of the minds as to such. 
In this case, there are no facts to suggest that these parties intended the 
creation of an indemnification contract, let alone reached a meeting of the minds. 
Phoenix's strained assertion that by getting into a car wreck Yardley somehow requested10 
Phoenix to pay Merrill coverage is a unplausible. How did she request this? Why would 
she do this where Phoenix was already under a contractual and statutory obligation to 
9See also In re Estate of Orris. 622 P.2d 337, 340 (Utah 1980) ("To make out 
an implied in fact contract what must be shown is 'mutual intent. . . . manifested by 
particular acts and attendant circumstances.5"); Berube v. Fashion Centre, LTD.. 771 P.2d 
1033, 1044 (Utah 1989) (parties' conduct may give rise to contract terms where no 
express agreement was reached). 
^Phoenix argues that "the law" creates the intent. That is inconsistent with the 
above cited cases, and is an example of how Phoenix tends to blend the concepts of 
implied in fact and implied in law indemnity. 
13 
provide coverage anyway?11 
B. Phoenix does not meet the criteria for equitable indemnity. 
Phoenix also claims that because it had to pay Merrill $25,000 due to 
Yardley's negligence, it can recover that amount from Yardley under the doctrine of 
equitable indemnity. Phoenix believes that this result is compelled by the enactment of 
the "Financial Responsibility" statute, and by the interplay of that statute and the 
uninsured motorist statute. (Appellants' Br. at 11, 14). Phoenix's claim fails under three 
steadfast rules of law governing equitable indemnity in Utah. 
First, in all actions for equitable indemnity, this Court requires proof of three 
elements: 
(1) the payor (prospective indemnitee) must discharge a legal 
obligation the payor owes to a third person; (2) the prospective 
indemnitor must also be liable to the third person; and (3) as 
between the claimant payor and the prospective indemnitor, the 
obligation ought to be discharged by the indemnitor. 
Perrv v. Pioneer Wholesale Supply Co., 681 P.2d 214, 218 (Utah 1984). These elements 
are qualified by the statement that no cause of action for equitable indemnity may arise 
11
 Also, an implied in fact contract must be supported by consideration just as 
with any express contract. See Johnson v. Morton ThiokoL Inc., 818 P.2d 997, 1002 
(Utah 1991) (noting the need for consideration in implied in fact contracts). Phoenix's 
implied in fact contract theory fails because the performance of a preexisting statutory 
duty is insufficient consideration to form a binding contract. S^e Gianetti v. Norwalk 
Hosptial, 557 A.2d 1249, 1253-54 (Conn. 1989). Here, Phoenix's payment of uninsured 
motorist sums was the performance of a preexisting statutory duty, and thus cannot form 
the basis of a binding contract. 
14 
"until the liability of the party seeking indemnity results in his damage, either through 
payment of a sum clearly owed or through the injured party's obtaining an enforceable 
judgment." Id. 
Here, it is true that Phoenix had a contract to insure Merrill. However, the 
payment of $25,000 was not a "sum clearly owed." Phoenix openly admits that the 
$25,000 it paid was in excess of its legal obligation to Merrill: 
On or about July 1, 1998, Phoenix Indemnity agreed to provide UM 
coverage to Mr. Merrill and, (1) in the discharge of its duty to Mr. 
Merrill and (2) for practical business considerations, settled with 
Mr. Merrill for the sum of $25,000.00. 
(Appellants' Br. at 5, f 12) (emphasis added). Thus, by Phoenix's own admission, part of 
the $25,000 was not the discharge of a legal duty. Under Perry. Phoenix may only obtain 
indemnity for a legal duty discharged, and cannot recover for its "practical business 
considerations." Nor does the uninsured motorist statute itself, section 31A-22-305(3) of 
the Utah Code, allow recovery for such sums: 
Uninsured motorist coverage under Subsection 31A-22-302(l)(b) 
provides coverage for covered person who are legally entitled to 
recover damages from owners or operators of uninsured vehicles 
because of bodily injury, sickness, disease, or death. 
Clearly that statute calls for legal entitlement, and its plain language defeats the notion 
that whatever sum was paid for practical business considerations was a sum paid under 
the uninsured motorist coverage for bodily injury, sickness, disease, or death. 
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Also, the fact that this matter was contested at trial, and that the jury 
determined the uninsured claim was worth substantially less than Phoenix paid confirms 
the fact that the $25,000 was never "clearly owed" legal obligation. (R. 545). 
Even more importantly, this Court has been very specific about what 
constitutes an insurer's legal obligation to its insured in uninsured motorists cases, and 
that legal obligation is even more narrow than the general rule laid forth in Perry. In 
Lima v. Chambers. 657 P.2d 279, 281 (Utah 1982), this Court stated: 
[I] fan insured is injured by an uninsured motorist the insured may 
recover damages from his own insurance company upon a showing 
that he is 'legally entitled' to recover those damages from the 
uninsured tortfeasor. This showing of legal entitlement entails a 
lawsuit against the uninsured tortfeasor to litigate the issues of 
liability and damages. A judgment favorable to the insured fixes 
the insurer's contractual duty to satisfy that judgment, within the 
policy limits. The insurer is then left to pursue its subrogation 
remedy against the uninsured tortfeasor. 
(Emphasis added). Thus, as between the insurer and the insured in an alleged uninsured 
motorist context, it is not possible to ascertain the limits of the insurer's legal obligation 
by arguing that a certain sum was "clearly owed" as might be sufficient under Perry. 
Rather. Phoenix's legal obligation to Merrill is fixed by a "judgment favorable to the 
insured" against the alleged uninsured. 
In this case, when Phoenix paid Merrill there was not a judgment fixing 
Yardley's liability, and thus Phoenix had no "fixed" legal duty to Merrill at the time the 
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$25,000 was paid. (R. 578). However, even if the parties had reduced the special verdict 
form to a final judgment, it is undisputed that Phoenix's contractual liability, fixed by 
Yardley's jury determined tort liability, would have been substantially less than Phoenix 
paid. (R. 545). 
Second, the Utah Court of Appeals has stated that the "common foundation of 
both contribution and implied indemnity principles, however, is that they attempt to 
ensure that parties are not held unfairly liable to an extent greater than their degree of 
fault." National Serv. Indus.. Inc. v. B.W. Norton Mfg., 937 P.2d 551, 554 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1997). 
Here, the jury made a determination of Yardley's liability and Phoenix's 
damages. The interplay between the jury verdict and Utah case law defeats Phoenix's 
indemnity theory. See also Lima, 657 P.2d at 281. 
Third, concerned about subjecting potential indemnitors (Yardley) against the 
contractual or settlement whims of the of the potential indemnitee (Phoenix), the Utah 
Court of Appeals held that indemnity may not lie in any case against a prospective 
indemnitor (Yardley) where the sums paid by the prospective indemnitee (Phoenix) to the 
injured in a unilateral settlement are not reasonable. See Salt Lake City School District v. 
Galbraith & Green Inc., 740 P.2d 284, 287 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
Here, Phoenix paid $25,000 for a claim which the jury said was worth 
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substantially less, and which included payment for ''practical business considerations." 
(Docketing Statement ^ 8(1), R. 545, Appellants' Br. at 5, | 12). It is hardly reasonable to 
impose the weight of such an inflated, non-liability related settlement on Yardley's 
shoulders. 
Concerns over subjecting potential indemnitors (Yardley) against the 
unreasonable contractual or settlement whims of the potential indemnitee (Phoenix) are 
likely the reason for the dicta set forth by the Utah Court of Appeals in National Service 
Industries, Inc. v. B.W. Norton Manufacturing.. 937 P.2d 551, 554 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) 
(quoting W. Page Keeton et al, Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 50, at 336 (5th 
ed. 1984)), stating that the potential indemnitee must have discharged a "common 
liability."12 Clearly, an uninsured motorist (indemnitor) and the injured's insurance 
company (indemnitee) do not have common liabilities. The motorist's obligations are 
fixed by tort law, while the insurer's obligations are fixed by agreement, which means 
that the two could be miles apart. Suppose under tort law, a negligent party to an accident 
owes the injured $10,000 based on a jury verdict. Suppose further that under the terms of 
12
 Equitable indemnity in other jurisdictions also requires that the indemnitor's 
obligation to the injured be identical to the indemnitee's obligation to the injured. See 
Russell v. Evans. 920 S.W.2d 161, 163 (Mo. App. 1996): "This doctrine applies only 
when the duty discharged by the first party is identical to the duty owed by the second 
party/* This ensures that the amount demanded by the indemnitee is the same amount it 
paid to the injured. 
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the injured's insurance contract, the insurance company must pay $100,000 for the same 
accident. Under Phoenix's view of equitable indemnity, the motorist would reimburse the 
insurance company $100,000 for its losses arising out of the accident. That amount was 
never bargained for by the motorist and would be a full $90,000 in excess of his tort 
liability. 
Phoenix cites Salt Lake Citv School District v. Galbraith & Green Inc., 740 
P.2d 284 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) for the proposition that Phoenix has met the three 
equitable indemnity requirements set forth by the Utah Court of Appeals, and which are 
also found in this Court's decision in Perry. However, Phoenix's confidence in this case 
is misplaced. In Galbraith, the school district hired Galbraith & Green Inc. (an insurance 
consultant) to draft employee booklets explaining to district employees the insurance 
benefits offered through the district's self-funded employee insurance program. The 
district had a coverage dispute with one of its employees and eventually determined to 
pay the coverage based on its own assessment that the policy language was ambiguous. 
The district then decided to sue Galbraith & Green Inc. seeking to hold them responsible 
for the ambiguity. 
The facts in Galbraith are distinguishable from those in this case. First, the 
plaintiff in Galbraith did not have a statutory right to subrogation. Second, the "legal 
liability ~ of an indemnitee to the injured is different in this context than in an uninsured 
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motorist context, where legal duty must be fixed by a final judgment - there were no such 
restrictions in the Galbraith case. Third, the school district paid a settlement of $5,000 on 
a $6,200 claim, which the Court of Appeals deemed reasonable. In contrast, Phoenix paid 
$25,000 for a claim which the jury said was worth $8,707.14, and which included 
payment for "practical business considerations." (Appellants' Br. at 5, ^ 12). Such an 
amount is therefore not reasonable. 
Phoenix also cites Colman v. American Manufacturers Mutual Insurance 
Company, 930 F. Supp. 255 (N.D. Miss. 1996) to suggest that implied indemnity can 
apply in the uninsured motorist context. Instead of aiding Phoenix, the Colman case 
actually weakens its position. In Colman. the federal court opined that the Supreme Court 
of Mississipi would recognize equitable indemnity in the uninsured motorist context. 
However, "central to [its] decision'' was that the statute of limitations on its subrogation 
claim had run. In our case, Phoenix's subrogation claim was not only still alive, but it 
proceeded to trial and a settlement check was collected. Thus, even under Colman, 
Phoenix cannot have "a second chance for recoupment." Id. at 264. More importantly, 
nothing in Colman suggests that any equitable indemnity award could exceed the amount 
recoverable by subrogation. 
Finally, Phoenix asks this Court to find in the alternative that Yardley should 
recover in restitution because Yardley has been unjustly enriched. (Appellants' Br. at 33). 
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Besides the fact that no such cause of action has been set forth in the complaint, this 
claim has no merit since Yardley has now paid, and anything paid by Phoenix to Merrill 
in excess of the jury verdict in no way benefitted or enriched Yardley. (R. 1-3, Docketing 
Statement % 8(r)). 
In short, equitable indemnity is not appropriate under the circumstances of this 
case. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons discussed above, Appellee Yardley requests that this Court 
dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. In the alternative, Appellee Yardley 
respectfully requests this Court to affirm the ruling of the district court determining that 
no cause of action for indemnity exists under the facts of this case. 
DATED this<g£day of May. 2001. 
STRONG/ 
Paul M. Belnap 
Andrew D. Wright 
Byron G. Martin 
Attorneys for Defendant and Appellee 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this gP<Tday of May, 2001, a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing Brief of Appellees was served by the method indicated below to the 
following: 
Taylor D. Can-
Trent J. Waddoups 
CARR & WADDOUPS 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
8 East Broadway, Suite 609 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(yf U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
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'0 • • . 1 
Paul M. Bel nap. #0279 
Darren K. Nelson. //7946 
STRONG &HANNI 
Attorneys for Defendants 
Sixth Moor Boston Building 
#9 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City. Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801)532-7080 
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IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT , STATE OF UTAH 
IN AND FOR SANPETE COUNTY, MANTI DEPARTMENT 




MARLENE T. SMITH, aka MARLENE 
YARULEY and YARDI.EY INN, a Utah 
limited liability company. 
Defendant. 
ORDER RE MOTION FOR 
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
AND MOTION FOR 
CONTINUANCE 
Civil No. 980600228 
Judge David L. Mower 
The above entitled matter came on for hearing on February 16, 2000 before the 
Honorable Da\ id L. Mower with the parties appearing through their counsel of recoid. Ihe 
matters before the court were Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and Motion for 
Continuance. 
The issues having been briefed by the parties as well as argued orally and the Court 
having considered the written memoranda and the oral arguments and being fully advised in the 
premises, the Court determined that Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and 
Motion for Continuance should be denied. 
1. With respect to Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, the Court has 
determined that there are no disputed issues of fact, and therefore, the Court decides the same as 
a matter of law. 
2. Based upon the pleadings filed by the defendants and oral argument by the 
defendants' counsel, the Court treats defendants* Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs' 
Motion for Summary Judgment as a Cross-Motion for Partial Summary Judgment to Dismiss 
Plaintiffs' Claims of Breach of Implied Indemnity Contract, Unjust Enrichment and Restitution. 
2. Based upon the pleadings and argument provided to the Court, the Court agrees 
with the argument of the defendants and determines that as a matter of law there is no implied 
contract as between plaintiffs and defendants. Simply put, an implied indemnity claim or any 
other claim under quasi contract principles as against the defendants are not proper causes of 
action in this context. According!}, plaintiffs may not proceed under a theory of implied 
indemnity as against the defendants. Likewise, as a matter of law, plaintiffs do not have any 
other quasi contract claim as against the defendants, including but not limited to, unjust 
enrichment, restitution and the like. 
3. To the extent that plaintiffs may recover as against the defendants, plaintiffs must 
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establish that the defendants' negligence or proportion of fault is greater than that of Phoenix 
Indemnity's insured, Jason David Merrill, and that such negligence or fault was the proximate 
cause of damages, if any, suffered by Jason David Merrill. 
4. Based upon plaintiffs' counsel's representations that plaintiffs no longer seek a 
continuance in this matter, the motion for continuance is denied. 
Based upon the foregoing, it is 
HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that: 
1. Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is DENIED. 
2. Defendants' Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED. 
3. Plaintiffs* Motion for Continuance is DENIED. 
DATED this i l day of March, 2000. 
BY THE COURT: 
David L. Mower 
District Court Judge 
Approved as to form: 
Trent J. Waddoups 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
[ hereby certify that on this / day oi^PebntctrjriOOO a true and correct copy oi the 
foregoing Order re: Partial Summary Judgment and Motion for Continuace was mailed, llrst 
class postage prepaid, to: 
Taylor D. Carr 
Trent J. Waddoups 
CARR&WADDOUPS 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
8 East Broadway, Suite 201 
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Trent J. Waddoups [A 7657J 
CARR <& WADDOUPS 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW, L.L.C. 
8 East Broadway, Suite 609 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 363-0888 
Fax: (801)363-8512 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT, STATE OF UTAH 
IN AND FOR SANPETE COUNTY, MANTI DEPARTMENT 
PHOENIX INDEMNITY INSURANCE 
COMPANY and 
JASON DAVID MERRILL, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
MARLENE T. SMITH, a.k.a. MARLENE 
YARDLEY, and YARDLEY INN, a Utah 




Civil No. 9 8 0 6 0 0 2 2 8 
Judge David L. Mower 
Pursuant to Rule 41(a)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiffs and 
Defendants hereby jointly move and stipulate that the within action be dismissed. The 
underlying claim has been satisfactorily settled, and no counterclaims, objections, or motions 
remain pending. 
DATED this day of July, 2000. 
CAJRR & WADDOUPS 
myf. WADDOUPS 
"Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
DATED this X] day of July, 2000. 
STRONG & HANNI 
i)^rVY/n-^-^4^-
PAUL M. BELNAP 
DARREN K. NELSON 
Attorneys for Defendants 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I caused a true and correct copy of the above and 
foregoing document to be mailed, postage prepaid, this day of July, 2000 to: 
Mr. Paul M. Belnap 
Mr. Darren K. Nelson 
STRONG & HANNI 
9 Exchange Place, Suite 600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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ADDENDUM 3 
Trent J. Waddoups [A 7657] 
CARR & WADDOUPS 
ATTORNEYS AT L W , L.L.C. 
8 East Broadway, Suite 609 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 363-0888 
Fax: (801)363-8512 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT, STATE OF UTAH 
IN AND FOR SANPETE COUNTY, MANTI DEPARTMENT 
PHOENIX INDEMNITY INSURANCE ] 
COMPANY and ; 
JASON DAVID MERRILL, ] 
Plaintiffs, ] 
vs. ] 
MARLENE T. SMITH, a.k.a. MARLENE ; 
YARDLEY, and YARDLEY INN, a Utah ] 
limited liability company, ; 
Defendants. ] 
> ORDER OF DISMISSAL 
Civil No. 9 8 0 6 0 0 2 2 8 
! Judge David L. Mower 
Based upon the Stipulated Motion submitted by Plaintiffs and Defendants, Utah R. 
Civ. P. 41(a)(2), and for good cause appearing; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the above-entitled action be, and hereby is, 
DISMISSED. 
, 2000. 
BY THE COURT: 
Honorable David L. Mower 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
'OhCG 3 API 9 1H 
KRIrj - '-•'! 
SA!T£7E C?L'KTT OLEP.K 
BYJiuiAGY\ - ••-^7. 
ADDENDUM 4 
Paul M. Belnap, #0279 
STRONG & HANNI 
Attorneys for Defendants 
Sixth Floor Boston Building 
#9 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-7080 
F I L E 
SEP 2 8 2000 
CLERK SUPREME COURT 
UTAH 
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
PHOENIX INDEMNITY INSURANCE 




MARLENE T. SMITH, aka MARLENE 
YARDLEY and YARDLEY INN, a Utah 




IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY DISPOSITION 
Case No. 20000769 SC 
Trent J. Waddoups 
Taylor D. Carr 
CARR& WADDOUPS 
8 East Broadway 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-204 
Paul M. Belnap 
STRONG & HANNI 
600 Boston Building 
#9 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant Attorneys for Defendant-Respondent 
Defendant Marlene Yardley ("Yardley"), by and through counsel, hereby 
submits her Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Disposition. Pursuant to 
Rule 10(a)(1) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Defendant respectfully requests 
that this Court summarily dismiss Plaintiffs' appeal for lack of jurisdiction. 
INTRODUCTION 
The parties to this action have fully and finally settled their claims against each 
other. The parties have settled the case and filed a stipulated motion to dismiss Plaintiffs' 
claims. The trial court signed an order of dismissal that settled Plaintiffs' claims against 
her, arid never entered an order of judgment. Plaintiffs are now attempting an end run 
around their settlement and dismissal of their claims against Yardley by filing this appeal. 
However, this appeal is taken contrary to Utah law. As there was no final order or 
judgment in the trial court below, and as the parties have fully settled and dismissed their 
claims, Plaintiffs' appeal is improper for lack of jurisdiction. As such, Plaintiffs' appeal 
should be summarily dismissed. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. The action below arose out of an accident that occurred on October 
20, 1997 between Jason D. Merrill ("Merrill") and Marlene Yardley ("Yardley"). (See 
Docketing Statement ^ 8(a).) 
2. After various disputes arose between the parties, Plaintiffs moved for 
partial summary judgment. (See Order Re Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and 
Motion for Continuance, attached hereto as Exhibit A.) 
3. Yardley filed an opposition memorandum which the trial court 
treated as a cross-motion for partial summary judgment. (See id., attached hereto as 
Exhibit A.) 
4. The trial court denied Plaintiffs' motion for partial summary 
judgment and granted Yardley's cross-motion for partial summary judgment. (See id, 
attached hereto as Exhibit A.) 
5. As this ruling only disposed of a portion of Plaintiffs' claims against 
Yardley, the case continued on to trial which was held March 20-22, 2000. (See 
Docketing Statement If 8(q).) 
6. At trial, the jury returned a verdict finding that Yardley was 60% 
negligent in the accident and that Merrill was 40% negligent. (See Docketing Statement ^  
-3-
8(q)0 
7. Disagreements then arose between the parties regarding various 
proposed orders of judgment, that were never submitted to or signed by the trial court. 
(See Docketing Statement 1f 8(r).) 
8. On July 20, 2000, rather than submitting a proposed order of 
judgment to the trial court, Plaintiffs and Defendant filed a Stipulated Motion to Dismiss, 
pursuant to Rule 41(a)(2), whereby both parties agreed to dismiss Plaintiffs' action 
against Yardley. (See Stipulated Motion to Dismiss, attached hereto as Exhibit B.) The 
Motion, drafted by Plaintiffs' counsel, stated that "[t]he underlying claim has been 
satisfactorily settled, and no counterclaims, objections, or motions remain pending." (Id.) 
9. Pursuant to the Stipulated Motion to Dismiss, Yardley's insurer, 
Guaranty National, paid to settle Plaintiffs' claims against Yardley. (See Docketing 
Statement If 8(r).) 
10. On August 3, 2000, the trial court signed an Order of Dismissal, 
drafted by Plaintiffs' counsel, that dismissed Plaintiffs' action against Yardley pursuant to 
Rule 41(a)(2). (See Order of Dismissal, attached hereto as Exhibit C.) 
11. Despite the settlement and dismissal of Plaintiffs' claims against 
Yardley, Plaintiffs filed a Notice of Appeal with the trial court on September 1, 2000. 
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(See Notice of Appeal.) 
ARGUMENT 
I. AS PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS WERE SETTLED AND 
DISMISSED, THIS COURT LACKS JURISDICTION OVER 
PLAINTIFFS' APPEAL. 
Plaintiffs' appeal must be summarily dismissed as the trial court granted the 
parties' stipulated motion to dismiss and never entered an order of judgment. As such, 
there is no final judgment or order from which Plaintiff may appeal. The Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure provide that: 
An appeal may be taken from a district or juvenile court to the 
appellate court with jurisdiction over the appeal from all final 
orders and judgments.... 
UtahR.App.P.3(a). 
Where a party has improperly brought an appeal where the trial court never 
entered a final order or judgment the appeal may be summarily dismissed. The Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure provide that: 
Within 10 days after the docketing statement or an order granting a 
petition under Rule 5(e) is served, a party may move: (1) To 
dismiss the appeal or the petition for review on the basis that the 
appellate court has no jurisdiction . . . . 
Utah R-App. P. 10(a)(1). 
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Plaintiffs claim that this Court has jurisdiction over their appeal pursuant to 
section 78-2-2(3)(j). (See Docketing Statement, p. 2.) This Section provides that: 
(3) The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction, including 
jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over: (j) orders, judgments, 
and decrees of any court of record over which the Court of Appeals 
does not have original appellate jurisdiction. 
U.C.A. § 78-2-2(3)(j) (2000). 
This Court has held that, under this section, an appeal is not properly taken 
"from an order or judgment that is not final." Bradbury v. Valencia, 5 P.3d 649, 651 
(Utah 2000). For an order or judgment to be considered final, it "must dispose of the case 
as to all the parties, and finally dispose of the subject-matter of the litigation on the merits 
of the case.55 Id (quoting Kennedy v. New Era Indus., Inc.. 600 P.2d 534, 536 (Utah 
1979)). As this Court has stated, an order or judgment is final only when it "ends the 
controversy between the parties litigant." Id1 
For this reason, motions for summary judgment that do not dispose of all 
claims (i.e. motions for partial summary judgment) are not considered final orders as they 
do not end the controversy between the parties. See Bradbury, 5 P.3d at 65 i; Regan v. 
Blount, 978 P.2d 1051 (Utah Ct. App. 1999). For example, in Bradbury v. Valencia, 5 
1
 As this "final judgment rule" is jurisdictional, it is important to note that the 
parties cannot by any form of consent make a nonappealable order appealable. 
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P.3d 649 (Utah 2000), this Court heard an appeal by a defendant against whom summary 
judgment had been granted as to a disputed right-of-way. In granting the plaintiffs 
summary judgment motion, the trial court left for decision a counterclaim filed by the 
defendant as well as the claim of an intervener. On appeal, this Court held that because 
the trial court's order did not fully dispose of all the parties' claims, the order was not 
final for purposes of section 78-2-2(3)(j). See id at 651-52. This Court concluded that 
where an appeal is not taken pursuant to a final order or judgment, appellate courts lack 
jurisdiction except to summarily dismiss the appeal. See id. at 651. 
Similarly, where the parties settle their claims and the trial court grants a 
stipulated motion to dismiss, rather than entering an order of judgment, there is no final 
order or judgment from which a party may appeal. Millard County v. Utah State Tax 
Com'n. ex rel. Intermountain Power Agency, 823 P.2d 459, 461 (Utah 1991) (holding that 
settlement by all parties rendered the appeal moot making party's appeal defect for lack of 
jurisdiction); Black v. Alpha Financial Corp., 656 P.2d 409 (Utah 1982) (holding that 
party's acceptance of settlement rendered controversy moot for purposes of appeal 
thereby denying appellate courts jurisdiction). 
For example, in Cingolani v. Utah Power & Light Co., 790 P.2d 1219, 1222 
(Utah Ct. App. 1990), the heirs of a miner who was killed in a mine fire appealed a 
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settlement distribution awarded by the trial court. After the trial court determined each 
party's amount of the settlement, the heirs of the miner accepted the judicially determined 
amounts in full settlement of their claims against the owner of the mine. On appeal, one 
of the heirs challenged the amount she was awarded claiming that the trial court should 
have heard additional evidence regarding the financial circumstances of various other 
heirs. The appellate court found that one who accepts benefits under a settlement or 
judgment is estopped from later attacking the settlement or judgment on appeal. See id. at 
1221: see also Barton v. Utah Transit Authority, 872P.2d 1036, 1039 (Utah 1994) 
(holding that a party that voluntarily dismisses its complaint has not right to appeal, 
requiring that the appellate courts summarily dispose of the appeal) (citing United States 
v. Proctor & Gamble Co.. 356 U.S. 677, 680 (1958)); Hollingsworfh v. Farmers Ins. Co.. 
655 P.12d 637 (Utah 1982) (dismissing defendant's appeal as moot where it had accepted 
payment under the judgment appealed from and executed a written satisfaction of 
judgment).2 
In this case, there were no final orders or judgments entered from which 
2
 This doctrine is well-accepted in all jurisdictions. See, e.g., American Water 
Development, Inc. v. Citv of Alamosa, 874 P.2d 352, 374 (Colo. 1994) (en banc) (holding 
that "[i]n general a claimant who voluntarily dismisses a claim cannot appeal from the 
judgment of dismissal, for the judgment cannot be considered adverse as to the one who 
sought it") (citing numerous cases and authorities). 
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Plaintiffs may properly appeal this case. On November 30, 1999, Plaintiffs filed a motion 
and memorandum for partial summary judgment, essentially claiming that Yardley should 
indemnify Phoenix Indemnity for the amounts it paid in uninsured motorist benefits to 
Merrill. (See Order Re Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and Motion for 
Continuance, attached hereto as Exhibit A.) This motion was opposed by Yardley. (See 
id., attached hereto as Exhibit A.) At the hearing on Plaintiffs' motion, the trial court 
decided to treat Yardley's opposition memorandum as a cross-motion for partial summary 
judgment. (See id, attached hereto as Exhibit A.) The trial court then denied Plaintiffs' 
motion and granted Yardley's motion. (See ]d5 attached hereto as Exhibit A.) 
As the courts decision regarding the two motions for partial summary 
judgment only disposed of part of Plaintiffs' claims against Yardley, the case proceeded 
to a jury trial that was held on March 20-22, 2000. (See Docketing Statement, f 8(q).) 
Following trial, Guaranty National agreed to settle Plaintiffs' claims against Yardley. 
(See Docketing Statement ^ 8(r).) Pursuant to this settlement arrangement, on July, 20, 
2000, before the trial court had entered an order of judgment, the parties filed a Stipulated 
Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Rule 41(a)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, that 
was drafted by Plaintiffs' counsel. (See Stipulated Motion to Dismiss, attached hereto as 
Exhibit B.) In this Motion, the parties agreed to dismiss Plaintiffs' action against 
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Yardley, and stated that "[t]he underlying claim has been satisfactorily settled, and no 
counterclaims, objections, or motions remain pending." (Id.) Pursuant to the parties' 
stipulated motion, the trial court then signed an Order of Dismissal dismissing with 
prejudice Plaintiffs' claims against Yardley pursuant to Rule 41(a)(2). 
Under Utah law, it is clear that the trial court's decision with respect to the 
motions for partial summary judgment cannot be considered as "final orders or 
judgments" as they did not dispose of all of the claims of the parties. See Bradbury, 5 
P.3d at 651. Likewise, it is clear that where the parties have settled and voluntarily 
dismissed all of their claims, counterclaims, objections and motions as against each other, 
this Court lacks jurisdiction over Plaintiffs' appeal except to summarily dispose of it.3 
See Barton, 872 P.2d at 1039; Cingolani, 790 P.2d at 1222. As such, it is undisputed that 
the trial court never entered a final order or judgment from which Plaintiffs may appeal. 
Instead, it is clear that the parties have agreed to settle and dismiss all of Plaintiffs' claims 
as against Yardley. Plaintiffs' appeal is nothing more than an attempted end run around 
the parties settlement of this case and should be summarily dismissed. 
3
 Utah courts have reasoned that the lack of jurisdiction over previously 
settled and dismissed claims is based on the fact that the controversy has been rendered 
moot by the settlement. See Millard County v. Utah State Tax Com'n. ex rel. 
Intermountain Power Agency, 823 P.2d 459, 461 (Utah 1991). 
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CONCLUSION AND RELIEF SOUGHT 
Pursuant to Rule 10(a)(1) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, 
Defendant respectfully requests that this Court summarily dismiss Plaintiffs appeal for 
lack of jurisdiction. 
DATED this^Jday of September, 2000. 
STRONCT& HANNI 
Paul M. Belnap 
Attorneys for Defendant and Appellee 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this day of September, 2000, a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
DISPOSITION was served by the method indicated below to the following: 
Taylor D. Can-
Trent J. Waddoups 
CARR & WADDOUPS 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
8 East Broadway, Suite 609 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
( )y U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
{/) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
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Trent J. Waddoups 
CARR & WADDOUPS 
8 East Broadway, Suite 609 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
RE: Phoenix Indemnity v. Mariene Yardley and Yardley Inn 
Dear Trent: 
We are in receipt of your letter dated July 20, 2000 regarding the stipulated motion to 
dismiss and settlement in this case. We are in agreement to settle this case for the sum of 
$13,242.78. We will execute the stipulation for dismissal and we will forward the check to you 
with those documents. 
As discussed on the telephone recently, it has been our intention to get this case 
settled so that a judgment is not entered as against Mariene Yardley. We understand that you 
intend to appeal the summary judgment denial pertaining to indemnity. We cannot stipulate, 
however, that your client has any greater or lesser rights pertaining to an appeal on the indemnity 
than what is provided under law. I think that you can appreciate the same. 
If you have any questions or concerns, please do not hesitate to call. 
Very truly yours, 
STRONG & HANNI 
By plWn f< • M.t%r, 
Paul M. Belnap 
Darren K. Nelson 
DKN/bn 
cc: Mariene Yardley 
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Trent J. Waddoups 
CARR&WADDOUPS 
8 East Broadway, Suite 609 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
RE: Phoenix hidemnity v. Marlene Yardley and Yardley Inn 
Dear Trent: 
Enclosed you will find our client's check in the amount of $13,242.78, the amount of 
the agreed-upon settlement. 
I will forward the Stipulated Motion to Dismiss and the Order of Dismissal to Judge 
Mower for entry. 
If you have any questions, please feel free to call. 
Very truly yours, 
STRONG & HANNI 
By Ttorvsntt- M<Jfe* 
Paul M. Belnap 
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